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THE INTERNAL MORALITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Evan Fox-Decent and Evanj Criddle*
I. Introduction
We would like to express our sincere thanks to the McGill Law Jour-
nal for organizing the symposium that was the wellspring for this volume.
We gratefully acknowledge as well our debt to the volume's contributors-
Seth Davis, Chim~ne Keitner, Fr6d6ric M6gret, Jens David Ohlin, Ed-
mund Robinson, and Kimberley N. Trapp-and to colleagues who partici-
pated in the symposium by offering valuable commentary: Margaret
de Guzman, Colin Grey, Richard Janda, and Patrick Macklem.
We will offer reflections on our colleagues' insightful commentary in
Part IV. Before doing so, however, we will first use this opportunity to of-
fer a brief restatement of two central ideas from Fiduciaries of Humanity, 1
and their relationship to one another: the prohibition on unilateralism
and the fiduciary criterion of legitimacy. The prohibition on unilateralism
is a legal principle that denies one party any authority or entitlement to
dictate terms to another party of equal standing. The fiduciary criterion of
legitimacy is a standard of adequacy for assessing the normative legitima-
cy and lawfulness of the actions of international public actors. The criteri-
on demands that public actions have a representational character in that,
for them to be legitimate and lawful, they must be intelligible as actions
taken in the name of, or on behalf of, the persons subject to them. In
Part II, we elaborate on some of the ways international law reflects the
prohibition on unilateralism and the fiduciary criterion. We suggest that
the two are complementary, and that their synthesis comprises an inter-
nal morality of international law.
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In Part III, we elaborate on our conception of the internal morality of
international law, drawing on the writings of Lon L. Fuller. We compare
the fiduciary internal morality with the Fullerian theory developed by
Jutta Brun6e and Stephen Toope, and suggest that the fiduciary theory
can underwrite a compelling account of the rule of international law. We
then use the fiduciary construal of the rule of international law, in
Part IV, to develop or comment on our colleagues' contributions to this
volume.
II. Standing to Resist Unilateralism
In Fiduciaries of Humanity, we suggest that the prohibition on unilat-
eralism operates as an organizing idea of international law at a number of
levels and across a wide range of fields. At the interstate level, the princi-
ple explains the foundational doctrine of sovereign equality according to
which states enjoy legal equality and independence from one another,
since independent equals cannot dictate terms to one another. States are
thus barred at international law from violating the territorial integrity of
other states, and from otherwise interfering unilaterally in the internal
affairs of other states. When disputes arise, states are expected to pursue
good faith negotiations, with resort to impartial third-party arbitration or
adjudication if necessary.1
At the intrastate level, the prohibition on unilateralism bars individu-
als from dictating terms to one another. If one individual were legally en-
titled to impose terms of interaction on another, the principle of legal
equality would be compromised. The ascendant party to the interaction
would possess a legal prerogative not enjoyed by the other. On a Kantian
construal, the prohibition on unilateralism follows from Kant's innate
right to equal freedom; the mere subjection of one individual to the will of
another (even if the other is reasonable, acting in good faith, and so on) is
a wrongful compromise of equal freedom. On a Hobbesian construal, uni-
lateralism's violation of the principle of legal equality is enough to demon-
strate its wrongfulness. At the intrastate level of individuals and groups
interacting with one another as private parties, the prohibition on unilat-
eralism bears on horizontal relations between those individuals and
groups.
We argue in Fiduciaries of Humanity that the prohibition on unilater-
alism may be understood to have two aspects. One is captured by the
Kantian principle that no person may be treated as a mere means, but on-
ly as an end, which is the principle of non-instrumentalization. The other
1 See ibid at ch 8; Evan J Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, "Mandatory Multilateralism"
(2019) 113:2 Am J Intl L 272 [Criddle & Fox-Decent, "Mandatory Multilateralism"].
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aspect is the republican principle of non-domination, according to which
one person may not be subject to the arbitrary will of another. The Kanti-
an principle condemns actual abuse. The republican principle condemns
the possession of arbitrary power that would make abuse possible, wheth-
er or not the power is ever in fact used abusively. On our construal, inter-
national law recognizes and authorizes states to govern and represent
their people to safeguard them against instrumentalization and domina-
tion, and thereby provide for their equal freedom and legal equality.
States offer a vertical relation of authority to resolve a horizontal problem
of injustice.
But states, of course, bring serious risks of new forms of instrumental-
ization and domination. International law, we argue, mitigates those risks
by subjecting states to a variety of legal regimes protective of equal free-
dom and legal equality, such as international human rights law, interna-
tional humanitarian law, and international law's regime for regulating
emergencies. Within these regimes, some norms, such as the prohibitions
on genocide and torture, are regarded as peremptory or jus cogens, and
are of a kind from which no limitation or derogation is permitted. Two
puzzles are immediately apparent. First, on what principled basis can we
distinguish peremptory from non-peremptory norms? Second, how can we
distinguish legitimate and lawful state action from wrongful counterfeits
that constitute abuse or domination? The fiduciary criterion of legitimacy
emerges from the fiduciary theory's answers to these questions.
In our view, peremptory norms prohibit policies of intractable abuse or
domination that could never be understood to be adopted in the name of,
or on behalf of, the persons subject to them. Genocide and torture, for ex-
ample, are not intelligible as policies that could be adopted in the name of,
or on behalf of, their victims. By contrast, policies that modestly limit
freedom of expression for publicly avowable reasons (e.g., health warnings
on cigarette packages) are intelligible as polices that could be adopted in
the name of, or on behalf of, the persons subject to them. Put another
way, publicly justifiable limitations on certain human rights (e.g., the
right to freedom of expression) are consistent with fiduciary norms of
stewardship and representation that govern public authorities. We have
argued that these include principles of integrity (resisting corruption and
capture), formal moral equality (like cases receive like treatment), and so-
licitude (due regard for legitimate interests). The process and substance of
democratic public justification embodies the principles of integrity and
formal moral equality, and demonstrates due regard for the legitimate in-
terests of the people on whose behalf and in whose name authorities gov-
ern. In the case of peremptory norms, no such justification is possible be-
cause any infringement of these norms constitutes wrongful instrumen-
talization or domination, and so cannot be action taken in the name of, or
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on behalf of, the persons made to suffer it. The fiduciary criterion of legit-
imacy thus emerges as a standard of adequacy that takes its cues from
the norms that constitute and regulate representation, which are also
norms that resist instrumentalization and domination. In this context,
the fiduciary criterion lets us distinguish peremptory from non-
peremptory norms.
In Fiduciaries of Humanity, however, we argue that the fiduciary cri-
terion of legitimacy has a wider mission than picking outjus cogens norms
from the diverse catalogue of international legal rights and obligations.
And, we suggest that the criterion results ultimately from the fiduciary
structure of international legal order. Roughly, our account is that there
is a fiduciary power-conferring rule (the "fiduciary principle") within in-
ternational legal order akin to the power-conferring rule pacta sunt
servanda that transforms international agreements into binding treaties.
The fiduciary principle authorizes states to possess and use public powers,
but on condition that those powers be used in the name of, or on behalf of,
every person subject to them. The nature of public power on our theory is
therefore fundamentally representational, and its scope is comprehensive
across persons amenable to the relevant authority's jurisdiction. The fidu-
ciary criterion of legitimacy, therefore, is generated by the fiduciary prin-
ciple's limited and conditional authorization of public powers as well as
anti-unilateralist norms of role that constitute and govern representation.
The fiduciary criterion provides a normative standard for assessing
the moral legitimacy of a given policy. In the case of extraterritorially de-
tained terror suspects, for example, we argue that it would be morally
reprehensible to deny them humane treatment and due process. Such a
denial would instrumentalize the suspect and undermine the state's claim
to have authority to detain, since the detaining state would hold the sus-
pect in a manner that could not credibly be said to be done in the name or,
or on behalf of, the detainee. For the detaining state to make such a claim,
the state has to be conceived as a fiduciary of humanity, and as acting on
behalf of humanity in a manner consistent with minimal legal protections.
We suggest that the structure and operation of international refugee
law reveal vividly the idea of states as local fiduciaries of their people and
also global fiduciaries of humanity. In this context, we also claim that the
fiduciary criterion can play a conceptual as well as normative role. On our
account, the fiduciary principle authorizes states to possess joint steward-
ship of the earth's surface, but requires as a condition of its authorization
that states participate as fiduciaries of humanity in a collective regime of
surrogate protection in the service of exiled outsiders. Otherwise, an ex-
iled outsider could find herself with nowhere to go. Her very existence
would constitute a trespass wherever she happened to be. We thus advo-
cate treating the duty of non-refoulement as a customary and peremptory
norm of international law from which states are not entitled to resile.
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Were states to have such an entitlement, the legitimacy of international
law's distribution of territory to sates would be undermined because that
distribution could not be said to be made in the name or, or on behalf of,
humanity; exiled outsiders would be excluded. From the perspective of in-
ternational law, states that enforce exclusionary practices against neces-
sitous asylum seekers do so unlawfully. The failure to satisfy the fiduciary
criterion would also be a failure to meet an intrinsic requirement of inter-
national law.
In sum, the fiduciary criterion of legitimacy articulates a representa-
tional ideal that serves as a normative and conceptual standard of ade-
quacy. While it is always concerned with fidelity to role-based norms aris-
ing from representation, the criterion also invites critical assessment of
complex interactions of law and social facts, as seen in the case of interna-
tional refugee law. And the criterion presupposes that if it is satisfied,
then the relevant authority will have standing to govern and represent
the people amenable to its jurisdiction. Whereas unilateralism is the prob-
lem for which public authority claims to be the remedy, the fiduciary cri-
terion sets the standard public authority must meet both to succeed in its
anti-unilateralist mission and to have standing to rule. Combining the
prohibition on unilateralism with the fiduciary criterion, we argue now,
discloses the internal morality of international law.
III. The Internal Morality of International Law
In Fiduciaries of Humanity, we explain in greater detail how the pro-
hibition on unilateralism and the fiduciary criterion are immanent in the
juridical structure of positive international law, including the regimes
that govern international human rights, armed conflict, detention of for-
eign nationals, and forced migration. We argue that these principles are
constitutive of state sovereignty under international law, such that viola-
tions of these principles undermine a state's claim to exercise legitimate
authority. In the discussion that follows, we make the case that the prohi-
bition on unilateralism and the fiduciary criterion of legitimacy are essen-
tial features of international law's internal morality.
Our suggestion that international law has an "internal morality"
builds on Fuller's account of the rule of law. Fuller envisioned law as a
form of social ordering that uses authoritative directives to "create the
conditions essential for a rational human existence."2 In developing his
theory of the rule of law, Fuller emphasized the need for lawmakers to re-
2 Lon L Fuller, The Morality of Law, revised ed (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1969) at 9.
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spect human autonomy and rationality. Respecting human autonomy and
rationality was not merely a normative ideal, Fuller contended, but also a
practical necessity for those who aspired to establish a legal system. For
law to thrive as a form of social ordering, public authorities must appeal
to the rational capacities of persons by enabling those persons to under-
stand what the law requires and how the law will be applied so they can
conform their actions to its demands. Only when government treats the
law's subjects as rational, self-determining agents will its commands be
capable of attracting compliance and thereby nurturing a culture of legali-
ty.
Perhaps the most influential feature of Fuller's social theory of law is
his insight that government directives must share certain formal proper-
ties to generate legal order. In particular: (1) the directives must express
general, not ad hoc, commands; (2) they must be publicized; (3) they must
not be applied retroactively; (4) they must be intelligible; (5) they must
not be contradictory; (6) they must not "require conduct beyond the pow-
ers of the affected party"; (7) they must be relatively stable to enable com-
pliance; and (8) there must be "congruence between the rules as an-
nounced and their actual administration." A directive that failed to satis-
fy any of these eight desiderata would be "futile" from the standpoint of
contributing to a genuine "legal system," because it would afford no ra-
tional basis for people to orient their behavior in response to it.4 The eight
desiderata are also morally consequential, Fuller asserted, because a per-
son's moral duty to obey directives from public authorities would depend
upon the directives taking a form that could rationally attract compliance.
As Fuller explains,
there can be no rational ground for asserting that a man can have a
moral obligation to obey a legal rule that does not exist, or is kept se-
cret from him, or that came into existence only after he had acted, or
was unintelligible, or was contradicted by another rule of the same
system, or commanded the impossible, or changed every minute.
5
Fuller observed that these features of a functional legal system estab-
lish "a kind of reciprocity between government and the citizen with re-
spect to the observance of rules."6 Should public authorities fail to govern
with directives that satisfy the eight desiderata, their relationship with
their people would lack the reciprocity necessary to generate legal author-
ity. When this "bond of reciprocity is finally and completely ruptured by
3 Ibid at 39.
4 See ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
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government," Fuller explains, "nothing is left on which to ground the citi-
zen's duty to observe rules."
7
Although Fuller characterized his eight formal criteria as representing
law's "internal morality," he never claimed that a failure to satisfy these
criteria was the only way that an "attempt to create and maintain a sys-
tem of legal rules may miscarry."8 In Fiduciaries of Humanity we argue
that certain substantive criteria are also constitutive of international au-
thority. The concerns that motivated Fuller's theory-namely, respect for
human autonomy and rationality-support our fiduciary theory of sover-
eignty. To merit recognition as law, directives from public authorities
must offer rational grounds for compliance. Directives that violate the
prohibition against unilateralism or the fiduciary criterion cannot furnish
these kinds of reasons.9 For example, there is no rational basis to conclude
that people have moral obligations to comply with public directives that
authorize their own enslavement, arbitrary detention, or torture. These
kinds of directives are not plausibly interpretable as actions taken on be-
half of the persons subject to them. Accordingly, slavery, arbitrary deten-
tion, torture and other violations of international jus cogens dismantle the
reciprocity that is necessary, both practically and morally, to sustain legal
order. Thus, the prohibition on unilateralism and the fiduciary criterion
constitute substantive desiderata of international law's internal morality.
This insight offers valuable lessons for international legal theory.
Among scholars of international law, Professors Jutta Brunn6e and Ste-
phen Toope have proven to be Fuller's most eloquent and devoted disci-
ples, 10 but their exclusive focus on Fuller's eight desiderata commits them
to a distorted vision of international legal order. In their "interactional ac-
count" of international law, Brunn6e and Toope contend that internation-
al law's authority arises from "three interlocking elements" inspired by
Fuller:
First, legal norms are social norms and as such they are connected to
social practice - they must be grounded in shared understandings.
Second, what distinguishes law from other types of social ordering is
not so much form or pedigree, as adherence to [Fuller's] specific cri-
7 Ibid at 39 40.
8 Ibid at 38-39.
9 We do not argue here or in Fiduciaries of Humanity that satisfying these principles is a
sufficient condition to generate legal obligations.
10 The two scholars have developed this account most fully in their excellent monograph:
see Jutta Brunn6e & Stephen J Toope Legitimacy and Legality in International Law:
An Interactional Account (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) [Brunn6e &
Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law].
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teria of legality. When norm creation meets these criteria and, third,
is matched with norm application that also satisfies the legality re-
quirements, international law will have legitimacy and generate a
sense of commitment among those to whom it is addressed. 11
Brunn6e and Toope argue that Fuller's desiderata re sufficient to explain
why some international norms qualify as legally authoritative, while oth-
ers do not. Their account plausibly explains some features of international
law, including the scope of states' legal obligations in the global regime to
confront climate change.12 Yet, when their focus shifts to international
human rights, their theory proves wholly inadequate to explain the per-
emptory authority of jus cogens norms. To their own evident discomfort, 13
Brunn6e and Toope feel compelled by their own theory to conclude that
the prohibition against torture is not legally binding because state prac-
tice is not sufficiently congruent with the positive norm.14 This despite the
fact that the prohibition against torture continues to be universally ac-
cepted-even by the very states that have practised torture-as a per-
emptory norm of international law. 15
Brunn6e and Toope's interactional account of the prohibition against
torture suffers from two flaws. The first is their mistaken assumption
that adherence to Fuller's eight desiderata is sufficient to give people ra-
tional grounds "to have their behavior guided by the promulgated rules
even if they disagree with them on substantive grounds." 16 As we have
shown in Fiduciaries of Humanity and elaborate more fully here, when
national laws or practices intractably violate either the prohibition on uni-
lateralism (i.e., the principles of non-instrumentalization and non-
domination) or the fiduciary criterion, merely satisfying Fuller's eight de-
siderata cannot supply rational grounds for compliance. Second, when
evaluating whether a human rights norm is legally binding, the relevant
inquiry is not (as Brunn6e and Toope suppose) whether violations of the
norm dissolve states' moral obligations to comply. Human rights norms do
not exist for the benefit of states but for the benefit of human beings sub-
ject to their power. Accordingly, the proper inquiry is whether the pur-
l Jutta Brunnee & Stephen J Toope, "The Responsibility to Protect and the Use of Force:
Building Legality?" (2010) 2:3 Global Responsibility to Protect 191 at 193.
12 Brunn6e & Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra note 11 at 268.
13 See ibid ('Quite frankly, we are not at all comfortable with the conclusion to which our
analysis draws us in relation to the prohibition on torture, but we are firmly convinced
that the analysis is nonetheless correct.").
14 See ibid at 269.
15 See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 702 cmt d i,
§ 102 cmt k (1987).
16 Brunn6e & Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra note 11 at 30.
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ported incongruence between the positive norm against torture and state
practice gives people who are subject to state power a rational reason to
submit to torture at the direction of their own state. To ask this question
is, of course, to answer it. States cannot rationally suppose that their peo-
ple have a moral obligation to submit to their authority when the outcome
is torture. Accordingly, when states authorize torture or other violations
of peremptory norms of international law, these directives are incapable
of generating legal powers and duties. They are simply void ab initio, as
reflected in the doctrine ofjus cogens.
17
IV. Cultivating the Rule of (International) Law
Having explained how the prohibition on unilateralism and the fiduci-
ary criterion can complement a Fullerian internal morality of interna-
tional law, we are now better equipped to understand what i  would mean
to cultivate the rule of international law. Cultivating the rule of law at the
global level means establishing rightful relationships between states and
other transnational authorities, on the one hand, and the people who are
subject to them, on the other. As Fuller recognized, these relationships
can be understood as governed by the rule of law only if public authorities
treat people as rational, self-determining agents by establishing rules that
satisfy certain formal criteria. Taken to its logical conclusion, Fuller's ac-
count of the rule of law also demands that public authorities respect the
prohibition against unilateralism and the fiduciary criterion. In short,
states and other transnational authorities cultivate the rule of interna-
tional law when they treat people subject to their jurisdiction as equal
beneficiaries of international legal order.18 While we cannot work out a
fully realized account of the rule of international law in this brief reply es-
say, we use the space that remains to reflect on this theme while engaging
with our colleagues' contributions in this volume.
In Fiduciaries of Humanity, we make the case that international law
already embraces the rule of law's substantive dimension to an extent
that has yet to be fully recognized by the international legal community.
International law now defines sovereignty in relational terms, with the fi-
duciary criterion playing a central role in the constitution and distribution
17 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, art 53
(entered into force 27 January 1980) ("A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it
conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law.").
18 We offer some guidance on what this would mean for inter-state relations in Criddle &
Fox-Decent, "Mandatory Multilateralism", supra note 2.
774 (2018) 63:3&4 MCGILL LAWJOURNAL-REVUE DE DROITDE MCGILL
of state authority.19 The fiduciary criterion also supplies a standard for
assessing the exercise of sovereign power, as reflected in peremptory
norms of international law that govern human rights, armed conflict, mi-
gration, the environment, and other fields of international concern.
Some readers of our work have confused our theory of the rule of in-
ternational law with an aspiration to colonize public law with private law
rules and remedies. There is indeed a long history of international law-
yers injecting private law doctrines into international legal discourse via
doctrinal transplantation and analogical reasoning2 0 This is not our ap-
proach, however. We do not advocate applying private law directly to in-
ternational relations, nor do we argue that states are merely analogous to
private law fiduciaries, such that private law rules and remedies would
translate smoothly to public international law. Rather, we argue that the
fiduciary theory of state sovereignty offers a conceptual and normative
framework that captures the relational character of public authority un-
der international law. Characterizing states as fiduciaries makes sense,
we argue, because fiduciary relationships governed by private law and in-
ternational law, respectively, share a common juridical structure: in both
contexts, fiduciary relationships arise when one party holds entrusted
power over another party's legal or practical interests. International law
therefore recognizes the relationship between a state and its people as a
bona fide fiduciary relationship, albeit one that is sui generis and gov-
erned by legal requirements (e.g., human rights, jus cogens) that are re-
sponsive to the distinctive threats of domination and instrumentalization
that arise within this relationship.
Our methodology in Fiduciaries of Humanity is not simply to posit
non-domination and non-instrumentalization as first principles and then
to reason by deduction toward specific rules that accord with our ideal
conception of the rule of law. Instead, we employ a blend of inference to
the best explanation and Rawls's idea of a "reflective equilibrium"21-an
interpretivist methodology which requires that we take seriously the dis-
tinction between lex lata and lex ferenda22 Using this methodology, we sift
19 See Criddle & Fox-Decent, Fiduciaries of Humanity, supra note 1 at ch 1 2. See also
Anne Peters, "Humanity as the A and 2 of Sovereignty" (2009) 20:3 Eur J Intl L 513;
Helen Stacy, "Relational Sovereignty' (2003) 55:5 Stan L Rev 2029.
20 See H Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law (with Spe-
cial Reference to International Arbitration) (London: Longmans, Green & Co, 1927).
21 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971)
at 20.
22 Accordingly, Trapp & Robinson are mistaken to insinuate that we treat the fiduciary
principle as a "source" of international legal obligations. See Kimberley N Trapp & Ed-
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through centuries of international legal theory and practice to show how
the fiduciary conception of state sovereignty has become firmly en-
trenched in international legal order. We do not argue that the fiduciary
theory can explain every feature of international law. But we do claim
that the theory best explains and justifies certain constitutional elements
of international law, such as peremptory norms and the emerging rules of
state recognition, which are incompatible with the classical conception of
sovereignty as an "absolute" and "supreme" power that is "subject to no
law." 23
Fiduciaries of Humanity occasionally offers arguments for clarifying
or revising established rules of international law. For example, we pro-
pose that when a state responds with force to attacks from nonstate actors
abroad, international human rights law's (IHRL) restrictive standards for
the use of force should apply. We base this proposal on the observation
that when a state uses force against nonstate actors abroad, it arguably
exercises public powers in the host state's place, operating as a temporary
agent of necessity under international law24 If this is so, it follows that an
intervening state would assume the host state's fiduciary obligation to re-
spect the "right to life,' as enshrined in the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and other instruments.2 5 Although we recognize
that IHRL's applicability to asymmetric self-defense is not yet firmly es-
tablished in positive law, we do identify some tentative shifts toward this
approach in state practice, and we speculate that these developments
might eventually crystallize into firm customary or treaty-based obliga-
tions.
Trapp and Robinson reject this application of our theory. They argue
that "[c]haracterizing the intervening state, in the context of asymmet-
rical self-defense, as a surrogate sovereign is unrealistic" and "unlikely to
be effective in practice."26 In addition, they object that our theory does not
adequately "acknowledge or engage with" the tension between a state's
mund Robinson, "Extra-Territorial 'Fiduciary' Obligations and 'Ensuring' Respect for
International Humanitarian Law"' (2018) 63:3&4 McGill LJ 675 at 684.
23 Jean Bodin, Les six livres de la R&publique, ed by Christian Fr6mont, Marie-Dominique
Couzinet & Henri Rochais (Paris: Fayard, 1986) at 179 228, 295 310.
24 See Criddle & Fox-Decent, Fiduciaries of Humanity, supra note 1 at 190.
25 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS
171 art 6(1) (entered into force 23 March 1976).
26 Trapp & Robinson, supra note 23 at 683
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own "security interests" and the "human rights" concerns of foreign na-
tionals.27
We nonetheless remain convinced that our proposal to apply human
rights standards to asymmetric self-defense is not a utopian fantasy. As
we show, the United States has already incorporated human rights-style
standards into its rules of engagement for counterinsurgency and coun-
terterrorism operations, and it has employed these rules in a variety of
conflicts. IHRL's restrictive rules for the use of force are not always opera-
tionally convenient, but experience attests that they are feasible and can
be employed effectively in conventional settings involving asymmetric
self-defense. Nor have we overlooked the obvious tensions between a
state's duties to its own people and its duties to foreign nationals abroad.
Indeed, our chapter on the law of armed conflict focuses on working out a
principled resolution to this problem.28 We explain that this problem is
hardly unique to the law of armed conflict; across a variety of internation-
al regimes-including those that govern national security detention and
refugee protection-international aw requires states to balance compet-
ing fiduciary obligations toward their own people, on the one hand, and to
foreign nationals, on the other29
Ultimately, Trapp and Robinson's argument boils down to the asser-
tion that IHL norms, not IHRL norms, are "inherently" superior when it
comes to "balanc[ing] the interests of the intervening state's domestic
population ... against the rights to physical integrity of the local popula-
tion to the armed conflict."30 For the reasons we have articulated, we do
not consider IHL's superiority to be so self-evident. In our view, the non-
belligerent relationship between an intervening state and a host state
during asymmetric armed conflict points toward IHRL's more demanding
standards for the use of force. Taking the international rule of law seri-
ously (including the prohibition against unilateralism and the fiduciary
criterion) would require that intervening states be prepared to publicly
justify their use of force as the least harmful means available, as well as
show that any collateral harm to innocent civilians is no greater than
strictly necessary to neutralize the threat.
Keitner's essay for this symposium explains how this kind of public
justification is standard practice in the international legal system.31 Moti-
vated in part by our recent debate with Ethan Leib and Stephen Galoob
27 See ibid.
28 See Criddle & Fox-Decent, Fiduciaries of Humanity, supra note 1 at ch 5.
29 See ibid at ch 6-7.
30 Trapp & Robinson, supra note 23 at 683.
31 See Chinmne L Keitner, "Explaining International Acts" (2018) 63:3&4 McGill LJ 649.
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over the role of justification in IHRL,32 Keitner shows that a robust "cul-
ture of justification ... exists at the international level" and "includes an
expectation that states will articulate the legal and policy bases for their
actions, particularly when such actions depart from accepted norms of
state behavior."33 She traces this culture of justification through four epi-
sodes involving the use of force that have seized the world's attention
within the past two decades: the NATO bombing campaign in Kosovo
(1999); international military action in Iraq (2003); Russia's intervention
in Crimea (2014); and American, British, and French missile strikes in re-
sponse to Syria's use of chemical weapons (2017). In each of these epi-
sodes, states felt compelled by international law's culture of justification
to explain and defend their actions to the broader international communi-
ty.
Keitner's account of international law's culture of justification reso-
nates with the internal morality of international law as we have described
it in this essay. When states seek to persuade one another concerning the
lawfulness of their cross-border military actions and other deviations from
international law's default rules, they respect the internal morality of in-
ternational law. As Keitner observes, the practice of public justification
contributes to clarifying and crystallizing the content of customary inter-
national law, while also promoting compliance with established rules.34
"From the perspective of fiduciary theory," Keitner explains, "the core in-
sight is that an account of compliance that focuses exclusively on out-
comes misses an important part of what makes international law law:
namely, the ex ante and ex post processes of justification and explanation
that shape actors' collective understandings of what constitutes interna-
tionally permissible conduct."35 Thus, international law's culture of justifi-
cation contributes to a Fullerian legal order by promoting publicity, clari-
ty, consistency, stability, and congruence.
Ohlin's essay stacks one provocative claim upon another. The first is
that the doctrine of jus cogens is only seriously defensible from a natural
law perspective. The second is that it was only the murkiness of various
32 Compare Ethan J Leib & Stephen R Galoob, "Fiduciary Political Theory: A Critique"
(2016) 125:7 Yale LJ 1820 at 1877 (arguing that a "rigorous culture of justification [does
not] appl[y] to the international realm) with Evan J Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, "Keep-
ing the Promise of Public Fiduciary Theory: A Reply to Leib and Galoob" (2016) 126
Yale LJ Forum 192 at 195 (defending the view that IHRL requires justifications, not
merely outcomes).
33 Keitner, supra note 32, at 651 (citing the work of Etienne Mureinik and David Dyzen-
haus on the concept of a "culture of justification").
34 See ibid at 652 57.
35 Ibid at 673.
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accounts of jus cogens that likely prevented the doctrine from being dis-
credited or falling into disuse, given the dominance of legal positivism af-
ter the Second World War. He suggests we are not as forthright as we
might be about what he perceives as the fiduciary theory's natural law (or
natural law-ish) account of jus cogens.36
Throughout Fiduciaries of Humanity we prescind from entering juris-
prudential debates about the ultimate nature of international law. Our
chief aim is to offer an interpretive account of some of international law's
central doctrines and principles. While we are sympathetic to Ohlin's po-
sition, our hope is that the book might be attractive to inclusive legal posi-
tivists as well as natural lawyers. In principle, inclusive positivists could
interpret the fiduciary criterion as a standard of adequacy that goes ex-
clusively to the normative merits (and not validity) of international
norms. By contrast, anti-positivists can interpret the criterion as offering
a limited, substantive standard that in some cases (e.g., jus cogens) calls
into question the legal validity of inconsistent measures.37
In his essay, Davis takes issue with the fiduciary theory's purported
ratification of state sovereignty," arguing that the state system displaces
and effaces alternative forms of political association, such as those tradi-
tionally used by Indigenous Peoples, which "claim the authority to make
law that does not depend on the state's authority."38 The fiduciary theory,
however, does not presuppose the legitimacy of existing state configura-
tions, nor does it assume that states are the only legitimate form of politi-
cal association. Although Fiduciaries of Humanity offers an interpretive
theory of the contemporary law of state recognition, we accept that non-
state institutions may exercise forms of authority under international
law. We also appreciate Davis's insight that current compliance with the
fiduciary criterion, while a necessary condition for legitimate state au-
thority, may not be sufficient to establish legitimacy when a state has ac-
quired that authority through military aggression or colonial annexation
in violation of the prohibition on unilateralism.
Davis also contends that Fiduciaries of Humanity "overstates the
power of the fiduciary conception as such to resolve ... problems" and "pre-
36 See Jens David Ohlin, "In Praise of Jus Cogens' Conceptual Incoherence" (2018) 63:3&4
McGill LJ 701.
37 One of us has since argued that the fiduciary criterion can play this kind of role in an
anti-positivist jurisprudence that takes seriously the role-based norms of representa-
tion. See Evan Fox-Decent, "Jurisprudential Reflections on Cosmopolitan Law" in Jacco
Bomhoff, David Dyzenhaus & Thomas Poole, eds, The Double-Facing Constitution
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) [forthcoming in 2020].
38 Seth Davis, "The Private Law State" (2018) 63:3&4 McGill LJ 725 at 759.
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scribe particular doctrines in international law."39 He seems to believe
that our theory cannot succeed unless private law concepts and doctrines
offer clear, unequivocal, and uncontroversial guidance for debates in in-
ternational law.40 This criticism misses the mark because it mischaracter-
izes the shape of our argument. Nowhere in Fiduciaries of Humanity do
we argue that the bare legal concept of a fiduciary relationship as such
dictates the resolution of particular problems in public international law.
Rather, we articulate a normatively rich interpretive theory of the fiduci-
ary relationship based on principles of non-domination and non-
instrumentalization as well as the fiduciary criterion, and we argue that
this conception best captures core features of international law.41
We do not deny, of course, that other scholars have offered alternative
interpretive theories of fiduciary obligations. We also recognize that na-
tional courts and legislatures have adopted varying formulations of pri-
vate fiduciary law rules, and some of these formulations are in tension
with our conception of the fiduciary relationship. But focusing on these
doctrinal divisions, interesting as they may be, misses the point of our
analysis.
Our argument in Fiduciaries of Humanity does not depend on the in-
ternational community reaching a consensus about the normative basis
for fiduciary obligations in private law. For our interpretive theory to suc-
ceed, we need only show that the normative concerns that underpin our
theory of fiduciary duties in private law are shared by international law,
and that these normative concerns offer intelligible criteria for explaining,
clarifying, and critiquing positive international law. Fiduciaries of Hu-
manity meets this burden by explaining how two guiding normative prin-
ciple s-non-domination and non-instrumentalization-underwrite the
rules of state recognition, human rights, and peremptory norms in inter-
national law. These normative principles enable the fiduciary theory to
address a variety of challenging questions, such as the difference between
torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment; whether the prohi-
39 Ibid at 743.
40 See ibid at 750.
41 At several points in his essay, Davis does acknowledge these contributions when he ob-
serves that our "core argument is as much a claim about the nature of fiduciary duties
as it is a claim about the fiduciary nature of a state's duties." Ibid at 733; see also ibid
at 751 (asserting that Fiduciaries of Humanity "rethinks problems of private fiduciary
law together with problems arising in public law"). This is exactly right. Elsewhere, one
of us has argued that the principles of non-domination and non-instrumentalization al-
so best capture the central features of private fiduciary law. See Evan J Criddle, "Liber-
ty in Loyalty: A Republican Theory of Fiduciary Law" (2017) 95:5 Texas L Rev 993.
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bition against state corruption is a jus cogens norm; and whether states
have positive legal duties to guarantee access to secondary education.
Davis is right to associate our fiduciary theory of international law
with "a lawyer's mindset about politics."42 At the very core of a lawyer's
mindset is a commitment to the rule of law, and the fiduciary theory is a
theory about how the rule of law operates in international affairs. It is
with this commitment to the rule of law firmly in view that we character-
ize the fiduciary criterion as part of the "constitution of international law,"
while emphasizing that international law's constitutionalization is, to
quote Martti Koskenniemi, less "an architectural project" than an eman-
cipatory "programme of moral and political regeneration." 4 3
Like Fuller's account of the rule of law, the fiduciary theory's "primary
appeal" is to international lawyers' "sense of trusteeship" and "the pride of
the craftsman."44 Lawyers, by virtue of their professional training and
role, are uniquely positioned to cultivate and safeguard the rule of law.
Thus, if the rule of law is to thrive in international affairs, it will depend
on international lawyers recognizing that they are not only advocates and
advisors for their clients, but also guardians of the rule of law and fiduci-
aries of humanity.
45
We share Davis's conviction that subjecting power to "the rule of law-
and the rule of lawyers-is not the only way to transform" international
society for the better.46 To make real progress, the international commu-
nity must also nurture a political culture and institutions that will com-
plement the law in establishing a global society where all people enjoy se-
cure and equal freedom. When all is said and done, international lawyers'
efforts to promote an international culture of legality might be less critical
to the cause of global justice than the work that diplomats, civil servants,
activists, and humanitarians perform in cultivating a cosmopolitan politi-
42 Davis, supra note 38, at 756. We therefore embrace Davis's effort to connect our work
with Martti Koskenniemi's vision of an international "culture of formalism." Ibid at 756.
Indeed, in Fiduciaries of Humanity we claim common cause with Koskenniemi in view-
ing global constitutionalism as a "mindset" or "practice of professional judgment." See
Criddle & Fox-Decent, Fiduciaries of Humanity, supra note 1 at 38 (quoting Martti
Koskenniemi, "Constitutionalism as Mindset: Reflection on Kantian Themes About In-
ternational Law and Globalization" (2007) 8:1 Theoretical Inquiries in L 9 at 18).
43 Koskenniemi, supra note 42 at 18.
44 Fuller, supra note 3 at 5 6.
45 For discussion of the relationship between lawyers' first-order fiduciary duties to their
clients and their second-order fiduciary duties to legal systems, see Evan J Criddle &
Evan Fox-Decent, "Guardians of Legal Order: The Dual Commissions of Public Fiduci-
aries" in Evan J Criddle et al, eds, Fiduciary Government (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2018).
46 Davis, supra note 39 at 759.
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cal and ethical culture, designing institutions, and introducing economic
reforms that reflect compassion, inclusion, and generosity for the desti-
tute and disenfranchised at home and abroad.47
Nonetheless, we think it would be a grave mistake to infer from this
that international law cannot play an essential part in the establishment
of a just global order. As Fuller recognized, law is the social mechanism by
which political communities affirm that every person is entitled to respect
as an autonomous, self-determining agent. Law accomplishes this, in part,
through the formal features of legal norms that Fuller identifies. Yet,
Fuller's eight desiderata do not exhaust the demands of legality. As we
have shown in Fiduciaries of Humanity, the internal morality of interna-
tional law also requires that public authorities respect people as rational,
autonomous agents by observing the prohibition on unilateralism and the
fiduciary criterion. These features of international law's internal morality
find expression throughout positive international law. They provide the
normative and conceptual structure through which peoples and individu-
als can progress toward a more just international order on terms of equal
freedom.
47 See Samuel Moyn, Not Enough: Human Rights in an Unequal World (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2018).
